cryptozkquantum
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I think this post is a good middle ground between the oversimplified layman-oriented quantum news articles, and the hyper academic quantum computing papers that are hard for a cryptographer to parse. As the field rapidly evolves, things here may become outdated or wrong. Feel free to leave thoughts/comments/corrections on the hackmd draft of this post! An old version was previously also posted on zkresearch. Thanks to Aram Harrow, Krishanu Sankar, and Lev Stambler for comments and discussions – all errors are mine, not theirs.
cryptozk
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The lack of trustless integration with web2 is one of the leading reasons that blockchains feel siloed from the rest of the world – there’s currently no way of trustlessly interoperating with the exabytes of existing information online, built up over decades by millions of users, that plug into every system that we use every day. The resulting isolation of blockchains leads to fully contained apps and ecosystems: a great fit for defi or gaming, but a terrible fit for pro-social applications trying to weave themselves into our daily lives.
cryptozk
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Why do we want PLUMEs? The proliferation of advances in zkSNARK applications has created a useful new privacy primitive: a user can prove statements about their identity without revealing their full identity. If you can provide a zkSNARK demonstrating that you know the secret key for an account that is a leaf of the Merkle tree of Bored Ape owners, then you can prove that you own a Bored Ape without telling anyone who you are.
crypto
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Intro to vickrey.xyz Thanks to an idea from @0xngmi, a team of @real_philogy, @outdoteth, and me recently prototyped the first maximally private Vickrey auctions on-chain [repo here] (also shoutout to @0x_Beans and @rauchp_ for some additional analysis and help). Unlike past implementations of Vickrey auctions on-chain, vickrey.xyz leverages uninitialized CREATE2 addresses to not only conceal the size of bids, but their existence (more precisely, their association). This is unlike existing implementations, which only hide the amount, but disclose the other bidders’ identities and their maximum possible bids.